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Abstract
According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of
the world. Classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated
by physical characteristics. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the
standard view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”)
are in all circumstances indistinguishable from each other. This in-
distinguishability doctrine is motivated by the (anti)symmetrization
postulates together with the assumption (“factorism”) that each sin-
gle particle is represented in exactly one factor space in the tensor
product Hilbert space of a many-particles system.
Although the factorist assumption is standard in the literature, it is
conceptually problematic. Particle indistinguishability is incompatible
with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term
is used both in classical physics and in the experimental practice of
physics. The standard view requires quantum particles of the same
kind to remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, so that a
transition to the classical picture of the world seems impossible.
In (Lubberdink 1998, 2009; Dieks and Lubberdink 2011) we have
proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does
not rely on factorism and that avoids these and other problems. We
further explain and develop this proposal here. In our view, particles
in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent. However, in
those situations where the particle concept is applicable, quantum
particles—identical or not—are distinguishable in the same way as
classical particles.
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1 Introduction
The physical world of everyday experience consists of individual objects that
can be distinguished from each other by distinctive physical characteristics.
Classical physics generalizes this picture into the microscopic domain by the
introduction of the notion of a particle: a classical particle is characterized
by an individuating set of values of physical quantities (mass, electric charge,
position in Newtonian absolute space, momentum, etc.). Although different
classical particles may have some of these values in common, there never
is a complete overlap because according to classical theory repulsive forces
become increasingly strong (and eventually diverging) when mutual particle
distances decrease, so that any two particles differ at least in their spatial
locations.
We can associate an individual name or a label with each classical parti-
cle: 1, 2, ..., N for a collection of N particles. This labeling can take the form
of providing explicit definite descriptions that identify particles by specifying
their unique characteristics (e.g., by statements like “Call the particle in the
bottom left corner of the container particle 1, the particle one centimeter
above it particle 2, etc.”). Often, however, it is taken for granted that distin-
guishing characteristics exist without actually using them to fix the labels.
In this case the reference of the labels is left open as a matter of convention,
and arbitrary permutations of the labels are not considered to correspond to
a change in the physical situation that is described.
In all cases, an assumption tacitly made in physics is that there is no parti-
cle identity beyond what can be based upon physical characteristics (values of
physical quantities including their time evolution, trajectories, and if needed
relational properties, see section 4)—this means a rejection of metaphysical
principles like haecceity or primitive thisness.
Which physical quantities are relevant for describing particles of a par-
ticular kind is governed by law-like physical principles (Lombardi and Dieks
2015). A distinction must been made between two sorts of such quantities:
the quantities that take values that vary depending on the state of the par-
ticle (e.g., position, velocity), and the quantities that are state independent
and typical of the kind of particle we are dealing with (e.g., electron rest
mass, electron charge).
Quantum mechanics also describes elementary quantum systems, e.g.
electrons, by means of state dependent and state independent quantities.
There is an important difference with classical mechanics, however: the state
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dependent quantities are now represented by (not necessarily commuting)
operators instead of numerical values, and instead of the classical state (or
“phase”) spaces we have to use vector spaces (Hilbert spaces). Nevertheless
there are strong similarities between the structures of quantum and classical
mechanics: for example, many functional relations between classical quan-
tities are taken over in quantum mechanics as relations between operators.
Where Poisson brackets between physical quantities occur in the formulas of
classical theory, commutators between operators appear in quantum formu-
las.
It is important for the subject of this paper to note that there is also
an analogy between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics with re-
gard to how many-particles state spaces are built up from one-particle state
spaces. Both classically and quantum mechanically, an N -particles state
space must be able to accommodate all kinematically possible combinations
of one-particle states. In classical physics, the state of one particle of a given
kind is fixed by the values of a certain number, n say, of (state dependent)
physical quantities. Therefore we need the specification of n · N quantities
to determine the total state of N particle of the same kind; the N -particles
state space must consequently be an n · N -dimensional manifold of points
(each point representing a possible state). If the one-particle state spaces
are discrete, with X possible states in each of them, the number of states in
the N -particles state space in this way becomes XN . Similarly, in quantum
mechanics an N -particles Hilbert space must be able to accommodate all pos-
sible combinations of one-particle states. However, the one-particle states are
now not defined by the specification of the values of a fixed set of numerical
quantities, as in classical mechanics. Instead they are defined as linear super-
positions of independent basis states (basis vectors) in a one-particle Hilbert
space; let us assume, for the sake of illustration, that there is a finite number
X of such independent basis states (i.e., the one-particle Hilbert space is
X-dimensional). In this case the combination of all basis vectors of N one-
particle spaces leads to a set of XN new independent basis states, spanning
the XN - dimensional “tensor” product space HN = H1⊗H2⊗H3⊗ ...⊗HN .
In this expression for the total state space (the tensor product), the one-
particle Hilbert spaces (the factor spaces) are labeled, 1, 2, ..., N . This is
analogous to the labeling of individual particle spaces, and the quantities
defined in them, in the classical case. A point in an N -particles classi-
cal state space (representing N particles of the same kind) has coordinates
(Z1, Z2, Z3, ..., ZN), where Zi denotes the set of quantities defining the state
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of particle i (which is different from the states of all other classical particles,
as noted before). Because each classical one-particle space represents one
particle with its unique state, different from the states of the other particles,
any labeling used for the one-particle spaces can also be used to label the
particles themselves (and vice versa). Usually these labels are of the second
category mentioned above: the numbering is introduced abstractly, without
fixing them by explicit reference to specific properties, with the consequence
that the labels may be permuted arbitrarily without changing anything in the
physical situation that is described. By contrast, in discussions of concrete
cases the labels of both state spaces and single particles are often explicitly
defined via definite descriptions, so that they are fixed and can no longer
be permuted. In this case the labels are shorthand for the individuating
one-particle states (e.g., the label 1 refers by definition to the particle that
at time t = 0 found itself at x = 0, and so on). As said before, in classical
mechanics this definite labeling via individuating states is always possible in
principle.
In view of the analogies between how the classical and quantum many-
particles state spaces are constructed it seems plausible to assume that also
in the quantum case one-particle factor state spaces (Hilbert spaces) and
their labels are in a one-to-one relation with single particles and their states
in an N -particles system. This is in fact the standard textbook view: factor
space labels are associated with single particles, which allows us to speak of
particle 1, particle 2, and so forth.1
However, as we shall argue, there is in fact no valid parallelism between
classical and quantum mechanics on this point: the factor space labels in the
quantum mechanics of particles of the same kind should not be thought of as
referring to single particles. Our argument will crucially depend on a specific
feature of the quantum formalism, namely that although the N -particles
state space possesses the structure of an N -fold product of Hilbert spaces, the
many-particles states in this space do not have the form of a concatenation
of one-particle states, each in its own factor space. This complication is due
to the symmetrization postulates, which prescribe that N -particles states
should be symmetrically entangled superpositions.
1This standard doctrine—that factor space labels refer to single particles—has been
baptized “factorism” by Caulton (Caulton 2014; Leegwater and Muller 2019).
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2 The symmetrization postulates
Consider a product state of the form |L〉1|R〉22, defined in a two-particles
tensor product Hilbert space for particles of the same kind H1 ⊗ H2, with
|L〉 and |R〉 standing for wave functions with support in narrow left and
right regions of space, respectively.3 The natural interpretation is that this
state represents one particle located on the left, and one on the right. Indeed,
appropriate position measurements will with certainty result in one successful
particle detection in the L region and one in the R region. The particles in
question are individuated by the orthogonal states |L〉 and |R〉, and one may
consequently introduce particle labels in the same way as in classical physics.
In fact, L and R themselves can function as particle labels.
Now reverse the order of the two particle states, so that the state |R〉1|L〉2
results. The particle that was originally represented in factor space 1, namely
particle L (the left one) is then represented in factor space 2, and the other
particle is described in factor space 1. This brings out a conceptual difference,
in principle, between particle and factor space labels—a point that will be
significant in our general analysis of the meaning of particle labels. However,
in our present example this complication appears to be without importance.
Indeed, given that particles are individuated solely by physical quantities (in
our case only by L and R), the two states |L〉1|R〉2 and |R〉1|L〉2 represent
the same physical situation, so that we are facing a case of theoretical surplus
structure. It is natural to remove this superfluous multiplicity of descriptions
by defining one single representation: stipulate, by convention, that we call
factor space 1 the one representing particle L, and similar for the particle R.
We thus obtain the unique representation |L〉1|R〉2.
This would be the same procedure as the one followed in classical me-
chanics. As mentioned in the Introduction, there is a conventional choice to
be made when we label classical particles, and this can be used to stipulate
that particle i is the one whose state is an element of the factor space labeled
i4. The multiplicity of theoretical descriptions in classical mechanics is thus
2We consider this state for the sake of argument: as will become clear in a moment,
such product states of particles of the same kind are not allowed in quantum mechanics.
3The labels 1 and 2 are not strictly necessary here and in similar expressions: the factor
spaces can be identified by their order, from left to right, in the expressions. For ease of
verbal reference we will go on using them, though.
4This is all on the assumption that the particles are of the same kind. When two
particles belong to different kinds, they are individuated by state independent physical
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dealt with as a harmless consequence of the conventionality of labeling. We
may conventionally select one set of labels and work with the single resulting
description5.
It is a very remarkable feature of quantum mechanics, however, that
the multiplicity of physically equivalent states that we just discussed cannot
occur at all. It is decreed, by quantum law, that for systems of particles
of the same kind product states like |L〉1|R〉2 and |R〉1|L〉2 are forbidden.
Only a third type of state, namely an (anti)symmetric superposition of these
product states, is allowed.
More precisely, there are two law-like postulates: a symmetrization pos-
tulate for bosonic systems, permitting only states that are invariant under
permutations of the labels, and an antisymmetrization postulate for fermions
that introduces a minus sign for uneven permutations. Thus, instead of the
two physically equivalent product states of our example only one of the fol-
lowing states is allowed:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
{|L〉1|R〉2 ± |R〉1|L〉2}, (1)
where the plus sign holds for the bosonic case and the minus sign for fermions.
The states |L〉 and |R〉 in Eq.(1) therefore occur symmetrically in the
factor spaces labeled by 1 and 2, respectively. As a consequence, if in analogy
with the classical case we assume that these labels not only refer to the factor
spaces but also to the single particles composing the total system, we have
to conclude that all these particles are in exactly the same state. Indeed, all
factor spaces contain exactly the same states in exactly the same way so that
the properties of the particles described in these factor spaces, as given by
standard quantum mechanics, are the same. it therefore becomes impossible
to individuate them by their physical characteristics.
In a more formal way this conclusion can be reached by determining
states associated with the individual factor spaces via the procedure of taking
properties that also distinguish the factor spaces. In that case swapping of states as
discussed here will not be possible.
5A rarely seen alternative is to take the full collection of states that relate to each
other by label permutations as together representing the physical situation—this “super-
state” has been called the Ehrenfest Z-star (Ehrenfest 1909; Dieks and Lubberdink 2011).
Another, more popular way of removing the multiplicity in classical mechanics is to go
over to the reduced phase space, by identifying phase points that are mapped to each other
by permutations of the labels.
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“partial traces”: tracing out over the parts of the total state labeled by 2
we obtain the mixed state W = 1/2{|L〉〈L|+ |R〉〈R|}; and exactly the same
state by tracing out over 1. These two identical mixed states represent the
one-particle quantum states as defined in the single factor spaces 1 and 2.
This conclusion generalizes to (anti)symmetric N -particle states, withN > 2:
each factor space label is associated with the very same mixed state.
3 Problems of factorism
The correlation between one-particle state spaces on the one hand and in-
dividuating particle states (one unique state for each particle) on the other,
which in classical mechanics justifies the double use of labels as both refer-
ring to one-particle phase spaces and to uniquely identified particles thus
breaks down in quantum mechanics. If quantum particles correspond to fac-
tor space labels in the way factorism wants it, they must all be in exactly the
same one-particle state and therefore they must all possess exactly the same
physical properties. Although there have been discussions of this feature,
in particular in connection with the notion of “weak discernibility” (more
about this in section 4), we believe that in the literature it has not been
appreciated sufficiently how weird, and adverse to the very idea of a particle,
this consequence of factorism actually is. As the symmetrization postulates
apply to the collection of all particles of any given kind in the whole universe,
for example all electrons, the factorist must hold that each single electron
is equally present at all positions in the universe at which there is “electron
presence”. So according to factorism it should not make sense to speak about
the specific electrons in my body, e.g., since all electrons in the universe are
equally present there. This result is not restricted to localization but holds in
the same way for whatever physical particle property one may think of. All
electrons, and in the same way all protons, neutrons and all other particles
of the same kind are mutually indistinguishable.
This leads to a lack of individuality that is in conflict with the very
notion of a particle, and is in stark contrast not only to how the notion of
a particle is used in classical physics but also to how it is used in physical
practice. This is important, because the very motivation for speaking about
particles also in the context of quantum mechanics derives from analogies
with classical physics and from the use that can be made of the particle
concept in experimental practice.
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To see a concrete illustration of the problem, consider the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm state. In the foundational literature the EPR thought
experiment (in its modern spin version due to Bohm) is standardly discussed
as pertaining to two electrons at a large distance from each other, with a
total spin state 1√
2
{|↑〉1| ↓〉2 − |↓〉1| ↑〉2}. The spatial part of the wave func-
tion is often not written down explicitly, but it must be considered as well in
order to make contact with the locality question that is at issue in the EPR
experiment. The total state including this spatial part has the form
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
{|L〉1|R〉2 + |R〉1|L〉2} ⊗ {|↑〉1| ↓〉2 − |↓〉1| ↑〉2}, (2)
where |L〉 and |R〉 as before are states localized on the left and right, re-
spectively, at a large distance from each other. In the language of wave
mechanics, |L〉 and |R〉 represent narrow wave packets. Note that the spatial
part of |Φ〉 is symmetric in the labels 1 and 2, whereas the total state is an-
tisymmetric as required by the antisymmetrization postulate (we are dealing
with fermions).
Now, if we are to accept the factorist position that the labels 1 and 2
in Eq.(2) refer to the two EPR particles, we have to reconcile ourselves to
the idea that there is neither a left nor a right electron. The spatial states
associated with both 1 and 2 are exactly the same, namely 1/2(|L〉〈L| +
|R〉〈R|), so that each of the corresponding particles would be “evenly spread
out” over left and right. This means that the way the EPR case is standardly
understood in foundational discussions and in experimental practice, as being
about two (more or less) localized systems at a large distance from each
other, is at odds with the official theoretical account, namely the factorist
interpretation of the indices 1 and 2 as particle labels6.
The problem is aggravated by the observation that the strange features
of factorist particles persist in the classical limit of quantum mechanics. The
symmetrization postulates are meant to be generally and universally valid,
in all physical situations; they are not affected by limits and approximations,
whatever the exact details of these limiting and approximation procedures
may be. This implies that the sameness of partial traces in all factor spaces is
6As we shall discuss in sections 5 and 6, the rejection of factorism makes it possible to
interpret the state of Eq.(2) as a representation of two localized systems. However, as we
shall see, the particular (“non-trivial”) form of the superposition in (2) stands in the way
of a full localized particle interpretation of this state. This is behind the non-locality of
state (2) that is manifested by violations of Bell inequalities.
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a general and robust feature of quantum mechanics that survives in the clas-
sical limit, with the consequence that even in this limit all quantum particles
possess exactly the same properties. Of course, this sameness of properties
cannot actually be upheld for the particles that occur in the classical theory
that results from a successful limiting procedure. So if factorism were right,
the particles that we know from classical physics could not correspond to
their quantum namesakes—e.g., in the limit there would be no transition
from electrons in quantum theory to electrons in classical electrodynamics.
That is a strange and undesirable predicament: as pointed out before, the
very introduction of the particle concept in physics is motivated by classi-
cal experience and we expect at the very least that the quantum concept
approximates the traditional one in classically describable situations.
Before explaining our alternative quantum particle notion that avoids
these problems, we want to discuss the attempt to salvage factorism by drop-
ping the requirement that particles be distinguishable by their own individual
(monadic) characteristics. The idea of this proposal (Saunders 2003, 2006)
is that it is sufficient for objects of the same sort in general, and identical
quantum particles in particular, to be provably different from each other by
virtue of the relations they stand in, even if it is impossible to refer to them
individually by physical means.
4 Weak discernibility
According to classical physics it is theoretically possible to have objects that
are different from each other even though they possess exactly the same
properties. A famous example was proposed and discussed by Black (1952)7:
consider two perfect spheres of exactly the same material constitution, alone
in relational space (in order to exclude absolute position as a distinguishing
property), at a mutual distance of 1.5 miles. By stipulation, no physical
features are able to distinguish these two spheres; but still there are two
of them. This seems a consistent theoretical possibility. Consequently, it
appears that the individuality of these spheres cannot be reducible to physical
differences (which seems to signal a violation of Leibniz’s Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles).
7Leegwater and Muller (2019) list and discuss also several other, similar examples from
the philosophical literature.
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However, as pointed out by Saunders (2003, 2006), who takes his cue
from Quine (1976), Black’s spheres stand in an irreflexive physical relation
to one another: a relation that an entity cannot have with respect to itself.
Indeed, each sphere has a non-vanishing distance to a congruent sphere of
identical composition. The irreflexivity of this relation (a sphere cannot
have a non-zero distance to itself, assuming the usual Euclidean topology)
makes it possible to satisfy a form of Leibniz’s Principle after all: if a sphere
stands in a physical relation that it cannot have to itself, it logically follows
that there must be at least two spheres. The spheres’ numerical diversity
can thus be grounded physically. Of course, in cases like this it remains
impossible to identify the objects by means of physical descriptions, since
any description applicable to one object applies equally well to all others—it
is only the numerical diversity that can be physically grounded8. Objects like
Black’s spheres (equal in all respects but still numerically diverse by virtue
of irreflexive relations) are called “weakly discernible”.
Saunders (2003, 2006) has suggested that identical quantum particles de-
fined in the factorist way are like Black’s spheres. The simplest case is that of
identical factorist fermions: although the states in the different factor spaces
are the same, irreflexive relations may be argued to exist between parts of
the total state associated with different labels. For example, in the singlet
state 1√
2
{| ↑〉1| ↓〉2 − | ↓〉1| ↑〉2}, the relevant relation is “having opposite
spin directions”. From this Saunders (2003, 2006) and Muller and Saunders
(2008) conclude that the objecthood of factorist fermions can be physically
grounded. Muller and Seevinck (2009) extend this argument to bosons. They
argue that quite generally physical differences are associated with different
factor spaces: operators (representing physical quantities) that belong to dif-
ferent factor spaces always commute, whereas this need not be the case for
operators defined within one and the same factor space. In particular, mo-
mentum and position operators with different factor labels always commute,
but do not when defined in the same factor space. This fact can be exploited
to define irreflexive relations, which in turn can be used to argue that even
bosons are weakly discernible objects.
There are several controversial points here, though (see for a more ex-
tensive account (Dieks and Versteegh 2008; Dieks and Lubberdink 2011)).
First, any argumentation for weak discernibility can only have force if the
8As Friebe (2019) notes, Leibniz’s Principle is therefore not saved in the sense that it
bestows a physically underpinned individuality on each object.
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irreflexive relations that are invoked are physically relevant. In the present
context this issue boils down to the question of whether relations between
mathematical quantities defined in different factor spaces may be interpreted
as representing relations between (candidate) physical objects—however, this
is precisely the issue under discussion in the debate about factorism. Put dif-
ferently, the irreflexivity argument by itself does not show that factor labels
refer to physical particles: the irreflexive relations between different factor
spaces can only be used to argue for weak discernibility of physical objects
if it already is assumed that the factor spaces correspond to such objects. If
factorism is assumed to be right, then we may conclude that the particles
represented in the different factor spaces are numerically different on physical
grounds. Without the presupposition of factorism we would just be studying
mathematically defined irreflexive relations between component spaces of the
total Hilbert space.
A second point to note is that the relations considered in the weak dis-
cernibility arguments are represented by Hermitean operators, whose inter-
pretation as physical properties can be disputed. Indeed, the standard quan-
tum doctrine is that such operators are to be used for calculating measure-
ment results, and that the outcomes of measurement interventions should
not be mistaken for what there was before the measurement was performed.
So although it is true that double spin measurements in the singlet state
result in opposite spin values, it is not self-evident that this is translatable
into a statement about a pre-existing relation between objects. Indeed, in
the context of the EPR-experiment the usual interpretation of the correla-
tions predicted by the singlet state is that these correlations testify to the
holistic character of the spin system and should not be explained by pre-
existing relations between spin properties of the parts. In fact, as argued in
(Dieks and Versteegh 2008), such correlations between measurement results
can also be understood without assuming a particulate picture.
But the most important objection from our point of view is that the in-
troduction of weak discernibility does nothing to alleviate the unnaturalness
and even weirdness of factorist particles. As noted before, these supposed
entities are omnipresent, find themselves all in exactly the same state and
share all their physical properties. They are therefore extremely different
from what we are used to call particles in ordinary language and classical
physics. Their potential weak discernibility, which makes them numerically
distinct even though they have all their properties in common, only adds to
their mysteriousness and does not make them more acceptable as particles.
11
We should surely strive for a quantum particle concept that is less extrava-
gant and closer to the ordinary concept of a particle; one that approximates
the classical notion in the classical limit. In order to achieve this we must
abandon factorism.
5 Quantum particles
An alternative way of defining and identifying quantum particles was pro-
posed in (Lubberdink 1998; Dieks and Lubberdink 2011). Its basic idea is to
associate particles not with the labels of the factor spaces, but instead with
one-particle states that occur in the total N -particles state. In fact, this
is precisely the motivating thought at the original basis of factorism itself:
the viability of the classical version of factorism was warranted by the strict
correlation between one-particle state spaces and unique one-particle states
in classical theory, as discussed in sections 1 and 2. This correlation breaks
down in quantum mechanics, which spells the demise of factorism. But the
idea of identifying particles by their states and properties certainly remains
eminently reasonable.
To see how this alternative notion can be implemented, consider again
the antisymmetric state
1√
2
{|L〉1|R〉2 − |R〉1|L〉2}, (3)
in which |L〉 and |R〉 stand for two non-overlapping wave packets at a large
distance from each other—one packet located on the left, the other on the
right. As we have seen, according to factorism this state represents two par-
ticles that are both in the state W = 1/2{|L〉〈L|+ |R〉〈R|}, so both equally
“smeared out” over left and right (and—perhaps, see our earlier discussion—
weakly discernible because measurements will show an anti-correlation be-
tween L and R results of double position measurements). However, the
nature of this state, with its two widely separated and narrow spatial regions
in which something can be detected at all, makes one rather expect that (3)
represents a situation with one particle on the left and one on the right; the
results of position measurements would confirm this interpretation. Actu-
ally, this interpretation is already silently adopted in the actual practice of
physics (for example in EPR discussions). In order to work out this alter-
native interpretation the particles should apparently be associated with the
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states |L〉 and |R〉, respectively, even though each of these states occurs in
both factor spaces.
In (Lubberdink 1998; Dieks and Lubberdink 2011) this idea was pro-
posed and worked out with special attention for the case in which the one-
particle states occurring in the total state do not overlap in three-dimensional
space—this avoids issues relating to the non-uniqueness of the decomposi-
tion of states like (3) and forges a bridge to the classical picture, in which
particles are always localized. The essential idea, however, is more gen-
eral: it is to associate particles with orthogonal one-particle states instead
of factor labels, and this may be possible also in situations where the states
do not have a spatial interpretation (cf. (Caulton 2014)). As it turns out,
a general theoretical framework can be used here that was proposed by
Ghirardi, Marinatto and Weber (2002).
Ghirardi, Marinatto and Weber (2002) start from the observation that
all observables (operators representing physical quantities, which in prin-
ciple can be measured) of systems of identical quantum particles must be
symmetric in the factor labels. That this has to be so can be seen from
the fact that asymmetric operators break the symmetries required by the
symmetrization postulates when they operate on states, so that they are
inconsistent with these postulates. It may also be concluded from the physi-
cal consideration that interaction Hamiltonians must be symmetric because
factor labels in themselves are not measurable (Dieks 1990). Candidate in-
dividuating particle properties can accordingly be represented by symmetric
projection operators (telling us whether or not a property is possessed, via
the eigenvalues 1 and 0, respectively). That means that we should not be
concerned with operators of the form P1 ⊗ I2, with I2 the unity operator
in factor Hilbert space 2, if we want to investigate particle properties, but
rather with projection operators like
P1 ⊗ I2 + I1 ⊗ P2 − P1 ⊗ P2, (4)
with P standing for the projection operator to be used in the case of a one-
particle system (in which there is only one factor space). The expectation
value of the operator in (4) in an (anti)symmetric state yields the probability
of finding at least one particle with the property represented by P when we
perform a measurement. The last term in (4) can be left out in the case of
fermions.9
9The last term of (4) was added to allow for the possibility that the same one-particle
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As Ghirardi, Marinatto and Weber (2002) observe, the use of such sym-
metric projection operators makes it sometimes possible to associate a set of
pure one-particle quantum states with a many-particles system even in the
symmetric and antisymmetric total states required by the symmetrization
postulates. Indeed, such (anti)symmetric total states may be eigenstates
with eigenvalue 1 of symmetric projection operators like (4), so that the
probability to find the corresponding property in a measurement is 1. When
this is the case, the proposal is to associate the one-particle state on which
P projects with one subsystem of the many-particles system.
This procedure leads to the association of N pure one-particle states
with an (anti)symmetric N -particle state, if the following condition is sat-
isfied: the total (anti)symmetric state is obtainable from symmetrizing or
antisymmetrizing an N -fold product state. Such (anti)symmetrized product
states are eigenvectors of symmetric projection operators of the type (4), if
the individual one-particle projection operators occurring in the expression
project on the one-particle states that are the factors in the (anti)symmetric
product. The usefulness of this result in the context of our earlier consid-
erations should be clear: in the case of (anti)symmetrized product states
one can define a set of one-particle states that are candidates for defining
one-particle subsystems.
In order to successfully employ this procedure for constructing an inter-
pretation in terms of distinct individual subsystems, the one-particle states
that we find should be mutually orthogonal. This orthogonality is guaranteed
in the case of fermionic systems; it may, but need not, obtain in the bosonic
case. In accordance with common usage and classical physics, as explained
earlier, we will reserve the use of the particle concept for subsystems de-
fined by orthogonal states—the thus defined particles are distinguishable by
their states (they are “absolutely discernible”, i.e. distinguishable by means
of monadic physical properties).
Accordingly, fermionic states that are antisymmetrized product states
can always be interpreted in terms of distinct particles. Bosonic systems
that are symmetrized product states do not always admit a particle descrip-
tion, because the one-particle states occurring in them need not be mutu-
ally orthogonal. In such situations bosons are better described as assem-
state occurs twice in the total state, which may happen in a bosonic state. Without the
last term the probability would become greater than 1 in this case. In fermion states
one-particle states cannot occur more than once.
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blies of field quanta (in a Fock space occupation number representation—see
(Dieks and Versteegh 2008; Dieks and Lubberdink 2011)).
This proposal for using the notion of a particle ((Lubberdink 1998; Dieks and Lubberdink
2011; Caulton 2014)) fits the actual practice of physics. The two-fermions
state (3) can be used for a quick concrete illustration. This state is an eigen-
state of the symmetric projection operators |L〉1〈L|1⊗ I2+ I1⊗|L〉2〈L|2 and
|R〉1〈R|1⊗ I2+ I1⊗|R〉2〈R|2, which leads to the conclusion that we have one
particle characterized by |L〉 and one particle characterized by |R〉, respec-
tively. The state (3) thus represents one particle at the left and one at the
right, even though the labels 1 and 2 are evenly distributed over L and R. In
the transition to the classical limit this will yield what we expect: classical
particles are localized entities, to be approximated by narrow wave packets,
following approximately classical trajectories.10
So what we propose is that the identification of quantum particles should
be grounded in the distinctness of physical properties, represented by one-
particle projection operators and their mutually orthogonal eigenstates.11
The thus defined quantum particles can of course be labeled, on the basis
of their individuating physical characteristics. However, these new labels do
not coincide with the factor indices occurring in the original total quantum
10Very narrow quantum wave packets spread out very quickly, and will therefore only be
able to follow approximately classical trajectories for a very short time. For the classical
limit, and the applicability of the classical description, conditions must be fulfilled that
counteract this dispersion of wave packets, like the presence of appropriate decoherence
mechanisms.
11We should mention the important point that the decomposition in terms of such
states as given in (1) is not unique. The equality of the coefficients appearing in front
of the terms in the (anti-)symmetric superposition is responsible for a degeneracy, so
that infinitely many alternative decompositions, in addition to the one in terms of |L〉
and |R〉 are possible. So the set of properties that distinguish the quantum particles
is underdetermined by the procedure as we have outlined it. To make the definition of
the particles unique some additional ingredient is needed, which picks out a privileged
particle-properties basis. One possibility is to postulate the position basis as privileged
(Lubberdink 1998; Dieks and Lubberdink 2011); this ties in with the localized nature of
particles in the classical limit. An alternative and more general idea is to assume that
properties and states have to be defined relative to an external “‘observing” system, and
that the interaction with the external system determines the property basis—cf. (Dieks
2019) for an exploration of this idea. In many cases the latter proposal will also single
out position as privileged, because interactions are typically position-dependent. This
issue of a privileged basis is not specific for our particles problem, but has a general
significance that in particular affects non-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics
(cf. (Lombardi and Dieks 2014, 2015)).
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state—the latter remain evenly distributed over all one-particle states, even
in the classical limit. Our proposal is therefore squarely anti-factorist.12
6 Non-fundamentality of the notion of a par-
ticle
According to the proposal that we have discussed, states obtained by an-
tisymmetrizing products of one-particle states can be understood as repre-
senting particles that possess their own distinctive properties. But obviously,
not all antisymmetric states are thus derivable from product states. Actu-
ally, the EPR-Bohm state (2) itself is a counterexample: although its spin
part {| ↑〉1| ↓〉2 − |↓〉1| ↑〉2} has the form of an antisymmetrized product, the
complete state displays a more complicated form of entanglement. This fact
is responsible for the non-factorizability of joint probabilities of measurement
outcomes on the two wings of the Bell experiment, and consequently for vio-
lations of the Bell inequality and for non-locality. By contrast, the “particles
state”
1√
2
{|L〉1|R〉2|↑〉1|↓〉2 − |R〉1|L〉2|↓〉1|↑〉2} (5)
does result from antisymmetrizing a product state and leads to probabilities
for spin measurements on the two wings of the Bell experiment that do
factorize. This means that in the latter state there will be no violations of
Bell inequalities and no no-go results for local models. In fact, the particle
interpretation that we have outlined immediately provides a local account:
the state (5) describes a situation in which there are two particles, one on
the left and one on the right—the particle on the left-hand side having spin
up and the right-hand particle spin down.
The essential difference between the states (2) and (5) is that in (5) a
strict correlation exists between spatial and spin states, which is not the case
12Leegwater and Muller (2019) suggest the possibility of constructing a new tensor prod-
uct Hilbert space, once anti-factorist one-particle states of the kind we have discussed have
been defined as states of the component particles. Their aim is to tailor this new space
in such a way that in it the many-particles state can be written as a product state, with
the component particles corresponding to the new factor spaces. However, even if this all
works well mathematically, it does not rehabilitate the factorism that we are discussing,
namely the doctrine that the factor space labels in the original tensor product space refer
to particles.
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in (2). Therefore, (5) represents two particles labeled by (L, ↑) and (R, ↓),
respectively (note again that these labels differ from the factor labels 1 and
2). Both of these particles possess a complete set of one-particle properties.
In (2) we cannot similarly define co-instantiated sets of particle properties.
Therefore, (5) lends itself to a straightforward particle interpretation but (2)
does not.
This example illustrates two things. First, the possibility of a sensible
particle interpretation of states of “identical particles” is not at all a priori
given. In fact, most of such states will not allow a particle interpretation.
This ties in with the second point illustrated by the example, namely that
typical and fundamental quantum features like holism and non-locality man-
ifest themselves exactly when a particle picture is not appropriate.
Given the fundamental nature of non-locality and holism in quantum
theory, it follows that the notion of a particle cannot be basic in this the-
ory. As we have seen, there do exist quantum states that can consistently
be interpreted in terms of constituent particles—in these cases the particle
picture bridges the gap between quantum and classical views and helps us
to understand the classical limit. But in situations that are fundamentally
quantum, as in the Bell experiment and other cases of non-trivial entangle-
ment, particle pictures may mislead rather than clarify. Consequently, the
particle concept should be considered as emergent rather than fundamental:
it is precisely when physical mechanisms come into play that wash out the
typical quantum effects like non-locality (decoherence plays a pivotal role
here) that the notion of a particle becomes applicable and fruitful.
7 Conclusion
According to classical physics particles constitute a basic category of what
there exists in the physical universe. Like everyday objects, such particles
are characterized by distinctive packages of properties. For example, each
electron has its own position, in addition to values for mass, charge and
momentum. As we have seen, there certainly exist situations in quantum
mechanics in which a very similar picture can be used, even in the case of
permutation invariant identical particles states. The state given in Eq.(5)
furnishes a typical example.
It is important that a distinguishable particle interpretation of such per-
mutation invariant states can be given. Without this possibility there could
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be no transition, in the classical limit, from quantum to classical particles.
Moreover, the way in which the concept of a particle is actually used in
experimental practice would not connect with physical theory. But this im-
portant possibility of interpreting permutation invariant states in terms of
distinguishable particles requires the rejection of factorism. In our opinion
this amounts to a refutation of factorism.
In states that are not (anti)symmetrized products, like the one of Eq.(2),
physical properties are not bound together in complete packages of one-
particle properties. A particle picture is in such cases not fully adequate13.
Such more general, non-fully-particle quantum states are typical of situ-
ations that manifest quantum behavior relating to non-locality, holism, and
other effects of non-trivial entanglement (entanglement that cannot be re-
duced to the effect of the (anti)symmetrizing of product states). Exper-
imental evidence that the world fundamentally displays such non-classical
behavior—even in cases in which we would prima facie expect that classical
physics is fully adequate—is accumulating rapidly. The classically motivated
notion of a particle does therefore not sit well with the fundamental consti-
tution of the physical world as described by quantum theory and as revealed
in high-precision experiments. Rather, the concept of a particle should be
seen as emergent : as applicable only if conditions relating to semi-classicality
(primarily concerning the washing out of effects of non-trivial entanglement)
are satisfied.
Awareness of the generally non-particulate nature of the quantum world
may provide novel conceptual tools for understanding quantum processes.
For example, as the state of Eq.(2) shows, it is possible to have quantum
states that manifest localization in individual narrow regions in space, with-
out complete packages of one-particle properties correlated to these individ-
ual regions. The spin part of the EPR-Bohm state does not combine with
the spatial part to form a description of two individual particles-with-spin.
Abandoning at least part of the usual particle picture in such cases, and
adapting our explanatory schemes to what the formalism is suggesting us,
may well provide new conceptual instruments, for instance for comprehend-
13One may consider the option of thinking in terms of incomplete packages of particle
properties in such situations. In the case of the state (2) this makes it possible to speak
about the system on the left and the system on the right, without assigning these systems
complete sets of definite particle properties. This strategy accords with the characteriza-
tion of the situation often found in physical practice, in which one speaks of a left and a
right particle sharing a global spin state. Compare the final paragraph of this section.
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ing quantum information transfer (Dieks 2017).
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